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ABSTRACT. Organizations constantly strive to unleash their entrepreneurial potential to keep up with
market and technology changes. To this end, they engage employees in practices like corporate crowd-
sourcing, incubators, accelerators or hackathons. These organizational practices emulate independent
“green-field” entrepreneurship by relinquishing hierarchical control and granting employees autonomy
in the choices of how to conduct work. We aim to shed light on two such choices that are fundamental
in differentiating hierarchical from entrepreneurial modes of organizing work: (1) choosing projects
ideas to work on and (2) choosing project teams to work with. Both of these choices are typically
pre-determined in hierarchies and self-determined in entrepreneurship. We run a field experiment in
an entrepreneurship course carefully designed to disentangle the separate and joint effects of granting
autonomy in both choosing teams and choosing ideas compared to a pre-determined base case. Our
results show that high autonomy in choosing implies a trade-off between personal satisfaction and ob-
jective performance. Self-determined choices along both dimensions promote subjective well-being
in a complementary way, but their joint performance impact is diminishing. After ruling out alterna-
tive explanations related to differing project qualities and homophilic team choices, the detrimental
performance impact of too much choice seems to be related to the implied cognitive burden and over-
confidence.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, a large body of literature has generated rich insights regarding the antecedents
of network formation within companies (see e.g., Kleinbaum et al., 2013; Burt, 2004; Quintane
Carnabuci, 2016). One of the issues researchers have explored is how formal structures shape the
creation of ties in the workplace (see e.g., Biancani et al., 2014; McEvily Tortoriello, 2014; Clement
Puranam, 2018). In so doing, they typically operate on the premise that individuals can choose their
collaborators, to build networks that are consistent with their objectives (Burt, 2005). However, it
is not clear that autonomy in collaborator choice is necessarily a good thing. For example, Ingram
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Morris (2007) show that even well-motivated and professionally sophisticated EMBA students strug-
gle to go beyond their comfort zone during mixers, rarely creating ties that extend beyond friends of
their friends.
The tension between the need to build workplace networks and potential problems associated with
endogenous network choice, raises the intriguing possibility that placing constraints on collaborator
choice may actually enhance outcomes. This possibility has real-world precedents. As Burt Merluzzi
(2016, pg. 374) note, not all collaborations are a matter of choice: networks are characterized by a
“mixture of exogenous assignment and endogenous choice, with the mix playing out differently for
different individuals.” An understudied question in this context is to what extent formal structures
or constraints on collaborator choice may shape the creation of ties in the workplace (see e.g., Bian-
cani et al., 2014; McEvily Tortoriello, 2014; Clement Puranam, 2018), and ultimately, workplace
performance.
A related, albeit smaller, stream of literature in organization design has explored how tasks are allo-
cated (Puranam et al., 2014). At one end, hierarchical organizations often assign tasks to workers and
at another, more “horizontal” organizations tend to allow for some autonomy in task choice (Barley
Kunda, 2001). For instance, in many “open” collaboration contexts, people who engage have the
liberty to choose the tasks they want to engage with (Levine Prietula, 2014). Of course, hybrid mod-
els of work organization, whereby employees split their time between assigned projects and projects
of their own choosing, are increasingly used in the business world. For instance, the company 3M
was early to give their employees a day off their daily work to spur innovation within the company.
An open question in this context, is whether autonomy in task choice actually improves workplace
performance.
This paper brings these two strands of literature together by asking whether allowing for choice in
team collaborators or ideas (or both) improves outcomes. This is, at its heart, an organizational design
question. In particular, choice along one or both of these dimensions constitutes a fundamental differ-
ence between horizontal, entrepreneurial modes of organizing work, and more hierarchical ones. In
the former, collaborators and ideas are typically a matter of choice. In the latter they are customarily
assigned, although there is a growing move in these organizations to mimic “pure entrepreneurship to
various degrees by relinquishing hierarchical control and granting employees more autonomy in the
choices of how to go about the work. This includes the time allocation to idea development alluded
to above, as well as by developing such practices as incubators, accelerators or hackathons.
Our aim is to shed light on whether allowing, or disallowing, autonomy of choice along these two di-
mensions, collaborators and ideas, improves performance. We do so by conducting a field experiment
in an entrepreneurship course. (Following best practice, we filed a pre-analysis plan before com-
mencing the experiment.) Our experimental setting has three key benefits. First, the entrepreneurship
course itself is inspired by the lean startup movement. This means that we are basically looking at
an early-stage entrepreneurship-type setting, with horizontal organizational structures, in which au-
tonomy in idea and collaborator choice is the norm. Second, we have access to a large subject pool,
of 900 students divided into 300 teams. This sample size furnishes us with the necessary power to
make meaningful statistical inference. Third, the output we use for performance evaluation is de-
signed to mimic the first stage of a venture capitalists dealflow (Bernstein et al., 2017; Brooks et al.,
2014; Huang Pearce, 2015). In particular, the deliverable after this 14-week course is a pitch deck,
which is evaluated by real venture capitalists, business angels and seasoned entrepreneurs. Pitch deck
performance is obviously a noisy predictor of ultimate business success (McKenzie (2017) expertly
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examines this later-stage outcome). Nevertheless, entrepreneurs generally need to pass this hurdle in
order to get their business off the ground.
The experiment itself has a two-by-two design, whereby participants are randomly assigned to one
of four treatment groups. The aim of this design is to disentangle whether allowing choice along one
of both of the idea and collaborator dimensions, impacts performance. In the first treatment group
Choose team participants can choose their own team but have to work on a randomly assigned pre-
defined idea. In the second treatment group Choose idea participants can choose their own idea but
are randomly assigned to a team. In the third treatment group Choose both participants can choose
their own team and their own idea. Finally, in the baseline treatment Choose neither participants are
randomly assigned to both a team and an idea. In using random assignment as the baseline because,
as Clement Puranam (2018, pg. 3880) emphasize, “formal structure - even randomly selected and
poorly enforced ones - are the benchmark that self-organizing systems must beat in order to replace
traditional structures in our organizational landscapes, and beating this benchmark is not necessarily
easy”. This baseline also seemed to resonate with accelerator programs and entrepreneurs who,
in informal interviews, highlighted what they saw as a large random component in team and task
composition based, for example, on coincidental temporal or spatial location.
2. PRIOR WORK
There has been substantial prior work on team composition and its effects on different facets of
entrepreneurial performance (see e.g., Cooper Saral, 2013; Horwitz Horwitz, 2007; Steffens et al.,
2012). Although entrepreneurship research has begun to pay attention to causal inference using
experimental designs (see e.g., McKenzie, 2017; Clingingsmith Shane, 2017), there are few field
experiments pertaining to entrepreneurial teams (Mao et al., 2016; Hasan Koning, 2019). This is
likely due to the difficulty of finding a field setting with a large group of potential entrepreneurs
one with a large enough sample of teams to yield statistically meaningful results. This difficulty is
aggravated by the dearth of contexts, which are open to conducting field experiments.
In two important examples of studies that overcome these hurdles, Hoogendoorn and co-authors in-
vestigate the effect of team composition on performance based on exogenous assignment to teams.
In a first natural field experiment, Hoogendoorn et al. (2013) study undergraduate students who start
up a venture as part of their curriculum. This experiment assigns students to teams based on gender
and finds that more gender-balanced teams outperform male-dominated teams. In a follow-up ex-
periment, Hoogendoorn et al. (2017) assign students to teams based on measured cognitive abilities.
They find that while average team ability has no effect on outcomes, variation in ability within teams
does. In particular, teams at intermediate levels of ability dispersion outperform teams with very low
and very high ability dispersions.
Our paper draws on a similar field setting but diverges from prior work in two important ways. First,
while most, if not all, of the literature on entrepreneurial teams discussed below has explored the
effect of team composition on performance, our focus is the effect of autonomy in choosing teams
and ideas. Team composition, in this context, may be a consequence of choice – and we will explore
this, too – but our focus is on the ramifications of autonomy in choosing teams and ideas on early
stage entrepreneurial performance. Second, our focus is on early-stage team performance as captured
by pitch decks examined at preliminary stages of a venture capitalists deal flow (Huang Pearce,
2015).
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2.1. Autonomy in Choosing Teams. The network literature has built impressive inroads to under-
standing the interactions between formal and informal structures (Gulati Puranam, 2009; Kleinbaum
et al., 2013; Biancani et al., 2014; McEvily Tortoriello, 2014). A key feature of this literature is that
informal structures do not fully mimic formal structures. Rather, ties in informal networks emerge
more organically. Burt Merluzzi (2016), in particular, maintain that networks are both a result
through exogenous assignment and endogenous choice.
Autonomy in choosing collaborators is ubiquitous in the context of entrepreneurship. Beckman Bur-
ton (2008) show that the formation phase casts a long shadow, from the point of inception, to the
direction a venture takes, and all the way to its performance in an IPO. Motivated by these find-
ings, the entrepreneurship literature has gone to great lengths to understand which characteristics of
teams improve entrepreneurial performance. Entrepreneurial teams are formed for a reason – en-
trepreneurs choose whom they would like to work with, frequently based on personal preferences or
complementary skills. Indeed, endogenous team formation is probably more common in the context
of entrepreneurship than it is in paid employment, where employees are often assigned to teams by
supervisors based on project needs. Self-selection into teams makes it difficult to establish the causal
effects of team composition on outcomes in real-world settings due to unobserved heterogeneity
across teams (Hansen et al., 2015).
We seek to explore whether being able to choose your own team members – as opposed to being
assigned to a team – has a bearing on performance. There are a number of reasons why team choice
might matter for performance. When choosing team members, people may select those with whom
they already have relationships, something that naturally fosters familiarity among team members.
This affords the opportunity for internal cohesion and coordination of tasks between team members
(Reagans et al., 2004). In addition to leveraging existing network ties, team choice facilitates match-
ing based on complementary personality traits, skills or experiences (McPherson et al., 2001). Since
the nature of relationships between team members determines the effectiveness with which a task
can be handled (Brannon et al., 2013), self-selected teams may well perform better than randomly
assigned teams that are, by construction, blind to such complementarities.
At the same time, prioritizing efficiency or performance over personal bonds in team formation is no-
toriously difficult. Ruef et al. (2003), for example, compared entrepreneurial team assembly mecha-
nisms with randomly assembled teams that could have formed, but did not. They find that “[F]ounders
of organizations appear more concerned with trust and familiarity, at this early stage, than with func-
tional competence, leading to a ‘competency discount’ in founder recruitment” (p. 217). This sug-
gests that choosing team members may have a downside in that people let social expediency take
precedence over business efficacy. This tendency to gravitate toward familiar faces is not restricted
to entrepreneurial settings. Ingram Morris (2007) traced participants in an EMBA student mixer
using RFID tags, to examine who interacted with whom. They find that, despite participants self-
declared motive of expanding their network by establishing new ties, the vast majority failed to do
so. Instead, they interacted with their friends. Even within larger organizations with well-established
organizational hierarchies, there is room for choice in professional interactions (Biancani et al., 2014;
Kleinbaum et al., 2013).
While it has been shown that people who are given the option of choosing their own team members
are possibly more inclined to choose people they know over strangers, the effect of such a choice
on performance can have divergent effects. For one, valuable time and effort can be saved if one is
already familiar with team members modus operandi. Time saved can be devoted instead to tackling
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the task at hand. Moreover, working with a self-selected group can raise social expectations within
the group, leading team members to exert more effort, which in turn translates to better performance.
2.2. Autonomy in Choosing Ideas. It has been popular in recent years to hail the people on a team
as being more important than the idea per se. This notion, popularized by Ries (2011), has ignited
interest among entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, even though rigorous empirical evidence sup-
porting this notion is hard to come by. Although entrepreneurs tend to choose the idea they would
like to work on, in many corporate settings tasks are assigned to teams. Even in the entrepreneurship
setting, some companies have experimented with providing less autonomy to choose ideas.
Separating the effect of an idea from other factors is not trivial, as an idea shapes a new venture
from its inception to its implementation. Some research looks at how an early version of ideas
translates into market success (Astebro, 2003; Goldenberg et al., 2001), but this work often captures
entrepreneurs who are well into the process. For instance, Goldenberg et al. (2001) study patents
and case studies from published books to disentangle why some ideas are more likely to succeed. It
seems likely, however, that many ideas die well before they merit patents or book mentions. Along
the same lines, Kornish Ulrich (2014) emphasize the importance of separating raw ideas from the
work that teams put into advancing an idea. They use data from Quirky, a crowdsourcing platform
that organizes weekly tournaments for product ideas where some ideas are then selected and brought
to market, to show that the raw idea has a large effect on the outcome.
A key feature of how organizations work is task division and task allocation, whereby managers tell
subordinates what to do (see e.g., Puranam et al., 2014), providing limited opportunity for employees
to choose the ideas they would like to work on. Because of inefficiency and coordination problems,
organizations typically assign employees to tasks (Fama Jensen, 1983). At the same time, the abil-
ity of employees to self-select ideas is often seen as a major source of intrinsic motivation (Lovas
Ghoshal, 2000). Using data from 23 different countries, Benz Frey (2008) find that self-employed
people are much more satisfied than those who are employed. Striking a similar chord, Thompson
(2000) notes that the more authority team members have to manage their own work, the more likely
they are to be motivated and involved in their work.
This has lead companies such as Github, Valve, Oticon, and Google to experiment with giving people
the mandate to self-select the ideas they want to work on. Having the autonomy to choose ideas
to work on may thus increase performance by getting people more attached to the ideas they are
working on. In their study of the Danish hearing aid company, Oticon, that allowed for employees
to choose the ideas they wanted to work on, Lovas Ghoshal (2000) note: “this created an internal
ecological environment where employees competed to join and stay with the most interesting projects,
and the people responsible for a strategic initiative competed to attract and retain the most talented
individuals.” So, rather than being assigned ideas to work on, employees were now being given
the choice to initiate new ideas to work on, and to join those ideas that they liked. In a critical
examination of Oticon, Foss (2003) notes how employees suddenly had the authority to work “just
like entrepreneurs in a market setting.” While Oticon has since moved away from their complete
bottom-up approach, the concept of employees coming up with their own projects is still intact in
many entrepreneurial settings. However, not all entrepreneurial settings are like this. The Berlin-
based Rocket Internet often decide to pursue an idea, then later assign or recruit a team to the task of
exercising the idea.
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2.3. Autonomy in Choosing Both Teams and Ideas. The jockey-versus-horse literature disentan-
gles whether it is the team or the business that matters. Gompers et al. (2019) survey 885 institutional
venture capitalists and find that they weigh the management team as more important than business-
related characteristics such as product or technology. However, Kaplan et al. (2009), for instance,
find that investors in startups should place more weight on the business (“the horse”) than on the
management team (“the jockey”). An important insight that stems from this literature is that teams
and ideas have to be considered in tandem, and the difficulty associated with disentangling the rela-
tive importance of teams over the idea. Our reasoning has thus far considered having the ability to
choose teams and ideas separately, but what is clear from this literature is that these can be pursued
in tandem by giving people the ability to choose both teams and ideas. There are two competing
explanations for how permitting more choice would affect performance.
One stream of literature on autonomy suggests that more freedom to explore options positively affects
creative performance (Hackmann, 2002). This situation is often observed in real life, where potential
entrepreneurs choose both their teams and their ideas. This environment provides the largest scope
for selection, with few formalized structures that constrain choice. The freedom of choice that this
affords should, if this argument is correct, translate into higher performance.
Another line of work offers a competing argument, that too much choice can be detrimental to per-
formance. Simon (1955) famously argued that maximizing behavior, which requires assessing all
possible choices, strains the limits of human cognition. He argued that in the presence of such psy-
chic costs, satisficing – making an acceptable rather than an optimal choice – might well result in
higher efficiency. Considering the choice of teams and ideas in tandem open up for new possibilities
for thinking about how high early stage entrepreneurial performance comes about. In other words,
one can go beyond comparing the extreme treatments of no choice with choice in both dimensions.
For instance, conditional on choosing your collaborators, do you outperform those teams that have
no choice in their ideas? Or conditional upon choosing ideas, would a chosen team outperform a
randomly assigned one? If team choice results in better performance than team assignment, and idea
choice results in better performance than idea assignment, it is natural to deduce that allowing for
choice in both of these dimensions results in better performance than disallowing it in one or the
other dimension. Theoretically, however, the answer to this question is not obvious. Team members
who know each other may be too distracted by their social interactions to choose suitable ideas or
even work efficiently Ingram Morris (2007). Similarly, they may choose ideas based on the personal
preferences of group members rather than the business merit of these ideas. As a result, performance
could potentially be enhanced by restricting choice along one, or both, of these dimensions.
3. THE EXPERIMENT
3.1. Setting. In order to explore the effect of choice along these two dimensions – teams and ideas
– on entrepreneurial performance, we conduct a natural field experiment. The experiment itself took
place in the Business and Entrepreneurship course at a public university in Germany.1 The uni-
versity offers a three-year (six-semester) undergraduate degree in various engineering majors, with
business as a minor in the curriculum. All undergraduate students at the university attend a manda-
tory, introductory, semester-long Business and Entrepreneurship course at some stage during their
1 A pre-analysis plan was registered with the American Economic Association RCT registery. This is available upon
request. Ethics approval was obtained from the university prior to the experiment.
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undergraduate study. This course is offered each semester and our experiment took place in three
successive semesters – referred to hereafter as “cohorts” – in 2016 and 2017. The Business and En-
trepreneurship course is divided between lectures and tutorials. Lectures are conducted by a variety
of different professors who cover their respective areas of expertise. All students attend the same
lecture component but are divided into smaller groups for tutorials. The experiment took place in the
context of the tutorial component of this course during which students, organized in entrepreneurial
teams, worked on developing and pitching business ideas.
Semesters are 11 weeks long, and 90-minute tutorials take place once a week. Each tutorial is run by
one teaching assistant (TA) and one experienced entrepreneur. We will refer to this TA-entrepreneur
pair as “tutors” hereafter. In order to prevent experimental effects and in keeping with standard
practice in natural field experiments, tutors were unaware of the experiment. In order to accommodate
for the large number of students, the same tutorial is taught simultaneously in multiple rooms where
each pair of tutors repeats the same tutorial twice on the same weekday to two different groups of
students: once in an “early session” and once in a “late session”. In cohort 1, there were four tutor
pairs teaching a total of eight sessions. Cohorts 2 and 3 both had 10 tutor pairs, amounting to 20
sessions each. There were between six and nine student teams in each session.
In tutorials, tutors guide teams of students through the development of an entrepreneurial pitch deck.
As we discuss later, this pitch deck forms the basis upon which entrepreneurial performance is evalu-
ated. The pitch deck is aimed at hypothetical venture capitalists and closely resembles the document
real entrepreneurs have to produce in order to get venture funding. It provides an in-depth understand-
ing of the idea, its feasibility, target market, and projected revenue. Over the course of the semester,
students develop their pitch deck and in the last session, they give a presentation of their final version.
3.2. Interventions. We implemented a two-by-two experimental design described in Table 1. In the
Team choice treatment dimension, students were able to either choose their own team or they were
assigned to a team of three members.2 In the Idea choice treatment dimension, students were able to
either choose their own idea or they were randomly assigned to work on one of 15 pre-determined
problem statements (ideas). This comprised a brief description of the problem they were to address,
along with an indication of how this problem could be resolved.
In the following, we denote the dummy variables that are equal to 1 if teams were allowed to choose
their team member and ideas as Team choice and Idea choice, respectively. We use these dummy
variables as independent variables in the regressions. Furthermore, we denote the treatment groups
that result from the 2*2 factorial design of the two treatment dimensions as Choose neither, Choose
team, Choose idea and Choose both, such that the Choose both treatment group, for example, is
determined by Team choice and Idea choice both being equal to one. We use these treatment groups
for descriptive and predictive group comparisions.
Students were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment groups. In order to ensure adherence to
treatment assignment and minimize contamination or experimental effects, the four treatment groups
were separated by time and space. Temporal separation was accomplished on the basis of early versus
late time slots. The physical environment allowed for spatial separation since five tutorial classrooms
2 In total, 96.5% of the teams had 3 members, 3.9% had 4, and 0.6% had 2. 4-member teams were necessary to balance
out participant numbers not divisible by 3; 4 students decided they would rather work in 2 teams of 2 than 1 team of 4. Our
results are robust to the exclusion of 2 and/or 4-member teams.
7
Table 1. Treatment overview
Team choice
0 = “Assign” 1 = “Choose”
3*Idea choice 0 = “Assign” Baseline“Choose neither”
Treatment group 1
“Choose team”
1 = “Choose”
Treatment group 2
“Choose idea”
Treatment group 3
“Choose both”
were in the west wing of the building, and five were in the east wing, with doors on either side of a
stairwell separating the two wings. Appendix A gives an example of this temporal and spatial division
for cohort 3, and Appendix B shows pictures for the interventions of all four treatments.3
Appendix C provides an overview of the substantive content of the 11 tutorial sessions. Depending
on their (randomly assigned) treatment group, students were informed of the room and time their
tutorial would take place at. So, for example, in cohort 3 described in in Appendix A, students who
could choose their own team members were assigned to the early time slots, with those in the Choose
both treatment in the west wing of the building with tutors 1 to 5, and those in the Choose team
treatment in the east wing with tutors 6 to 10. Students with no choice in the team dimension were
assigned to the late time slot, with the Choose idea treatments in the west wing with tutors 1 to 5 and
Choose neither treatments in the east wing with tutors 6 to10. Early and late time slots were both
on either side of noon, and students did not express any preference particular time slots. The east
and west wings were, similarly, indistinguishable. In our regressions, we use fixed effects to capture
systematic differences across tutors.
In week one, tutorials were dedicated to team formation. During the early session, all students were
informed in their room by a tutor that they would have the opportunity to self-select into teams
of three. Their choice was restricted to students in the same part of the building (i.e., people in
the same treatment). All doors between the east and west wings of the building were closed and
guarded by one of the tutors so as to ensure no mixing of treatments. Once all tutors had completed
their introductions, students were released to the hallway to find suitable team members. Every two
minutes a bell was sounded to encourage students to change partners and talk to new people. Once
three people agreed to be in a team together, registered their team. Tutorial rooms were closed once
they had reached a maximum capacity of nine teams, thus ensuring that all rooms had approximately
the same number of teams. Team formation lasted for approximately half an hour in all three cohorts.
Students in the treatments with team assignment (the late time slot in our example) were simply
informed of their randomly assigned team members by their tutor in their designated room. We show
later that the teams are balanced across treatments.
In week two, tutorials were dedicated to idea formation. Teams without choice in the idea dimension
were situated in the east wing. At the beginning of the tutorial, tutors handed out the randomly
3 Students have historically had no systematic preference for particular time slots. (The earliest slot starts at 9:45 a.m.
and the last one ends at 5:15 p.m., so the hours are not inconvenient for full-time students.) The classrooms in the east and
west wings are also comparable. Nevertheless, in order to avoid any systematic differences between treatment groups, we
randomized the temporal and spatial allocation of treatment groups across cohorts, such that each treatment group was in
at least 2 different locations and 2 different time slots over the course of our experiment.
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assigned ”idea” to each team.4 Assigned ideas resemble a problem definition. They are sketched
out on one page and steer the students in the direction of one possible solution. To deter students
from copying from one another, we provided 15 different ideas and no idea was repeated within a
given room; Appendix D provides an overview of all 15 ideas. Each of these ideas was extensively
pre-tested to ensure both good quality and fit with the objectives of the course. Teams with choice
in the idea dimension were situated in the west wing. During their second tutorial, students were
guided through an idea generation process. The students were given freedom in their choice of ideas,
provided it satisfied three criteria: (1) their idea had to solve a problem or add value; (2) there needed
to be a potential target market; and (3) there had to be a way to generate revenue through the sale
of the product or service. Ideas and their respective products or services could be adjusted over the
course of the class.
The final deliverable for each team was a pitch deck comprising a maximum of 10 slides. Other than
this, no formal restrictions were placed on the students.
3.3. Evaluation. In order to avoid experimenter effects and mimic real-life entrepreneurial situa-
tions, pitch decks were evaluated by practitioners. We had 40 such evaluators, who were practicing
entrepreneurs, business angels or venture capitalists with, on average, more than 25 previous pitch
deck evaluations and 0.875 founded companies per evaluator. Table 2 summarizes relevant char-
acteristics pertaining to evaluators’ expertise. In order to account for systematic variation across
evaluators, each pitch deck was scored by three separate evaluators. To avoid negative selection – for
example, attracting unsuccessful entrepreneurs in need of money – evaluators did not receive mone-
tary compensation. Instead, the evaluation effort was organized as part of an entrepreneurship event.
The event began with minimal social interaction and the distribution of the pitch decks with instruc-
tions for the evaluation. Names and pictures of the people in the team were redacted to ensure that
pitch decks were evaluated based on merit alone. Evaluators were instructed not to talk to one another
and were supervised in order to ensure that there was no communication. Once the evaluations were
completed, three keynote lectures took place. At the end of the event, participants had the opportunity
to network over an informal wine tasting.
Table 2. Evaluator expertise
Average per
Evaluator
# of startups founded 0.88
# of startups worked for 1.20
# of startups coached 2.51
# of startups funded with own money 0.65
# of startups funded as part of a venture capitalist decision 0.42
# of startups evaluated in the past 25.56
% self-reported qualification for evaluating the pitch decks 0.79
For the evaluation, all evaluators were given a verbal and a written explanation (see Appendix E) of
the procedure. The event took place in a large office building where every evaluator had their own
4Only one team refused to work on their assigned idea. They were given a different idea from the original list of 15.
Our results are robust to the exclusion of this team from the sample.
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spot at a large table. The event began by collecting general information on the evaluator and their
experience in the field was collected in a written survey. Following this survey, each pitch deck was
individually evaluated. For this purpose, all pitch decks were printed out, with an evaluation form as
the front sheet (see Appendix E, 3). Each evaluator was given a set of 23 or 24 pitch decks. Pitch
decks were randomly assigned to evaluators using a customized assignment problem algorithm such
that: (1) the same pitch deck was not evaluated by the same person twice; (2) the same assigned idea
(of the 15 such ideas) was not evaluated by the same person twice, and (3) each person evaluated
an equal number of pitch decks from all four treatments. We added a second heuristic approach by
randomizing the order of the pitch decks each evaluator received. This avoids temporal effects such
as being less generous as time progresses (Danziger et al., 2011).
Pitch decks were assessed on a variety of different criteria. Evaluators rated each pitch deck on a
7-point Likert scale, separately, according to: (1) novelty, (2) feasibility, and (3) market potential.
In addition, evaluators had to rate (4) the project’s likelihood of success and (5) the likelihood of
inviting this team for a follow-up meeting both on a percentage scale ranging from 0 to 100 percent.
Finally, once all pitch decks had been separately assessed, the evaluators had to allocate (6) a fictional
investment budget of one million dollars across the entrepreneurship projects they had to evaluate.
Evaluators could choose to spend some, all, or none, of their total (fictional) budget. This measure
allowed for a direct comparison across pitch decks and closely mimiced the decisions of real-life
venture capitalists. For this purpose, they were provided with stickers of fictional bills amounting to
one million dollars. They then had to stick these bills onto on a designated field in the evaluation
sheet of each pitch deck (see Appendix E).
These evaluation measurements constitute our performance indicators. The evaluation criteria were
derived from previous works by Maxwell (2011) and Dean et al. (2006), and pre-tested. The evalua-
tion concluded with a short exit survey asking the evaluators to judge the overall quality of the pitch
decks, and self-assess their qualification to perform such evaluations on a 7-point Likert scale. We
account for evaluator as well as order fixed effects in our analyses.
4. DATA AND METHODS
4.1. Sample. A total of 940 students enrolled in this class over three cohorts – 173 students in the
first cohort, 408 in the second, and 359 in the third. Of these 940 students, 27 dropped out, mainly
for personal reasons. This left us with a final subject pool of 913 students constituting a total of 310
teams, 300 of which had three members, 12 with four members and 3 with two members.
To register for the class, participants had to fill out an online entry survey collecting information
on their demographics, entrepreneurial experience, preferred team composition, and current skills
(see Appendix F). After the final presentation in the last session, participants completed a written exit
survey on their teamwork, satisfaction with the team and idea, new entrepreneurial skill development,
and overall learning (see Appendix G). Students were unaware that they were part of an experiment.
The entry survey has a 100 percent response rate while 94.5 percent took the exit survey; non-response
was uncorrelated with treatment assignment.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for relevant student characteristics, including demographic in-
formation, familiarity with entrepreneurship, and educational background. Our sample is balanced in
terms of predetermined student characteristics across the four treatments.
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Table 3. Balance checks
Average per Treatment
Choose
neither
Choose
team
Choose
idea
Choose
both
Personal Characteristics
Female 0.309 0.248 0.239 0.293
German citizen 0.843 0.853 0.872 0.853
Entrepreneurial efficacy 40.593 39.731 39.829 39.483
Risk seeking 54.034 52.920 50.380 51.177
Confidence 64.047 65.063 66.026 64.289
Entrepreneurial career aspiration 0.148 0.105 0.145 0.121
Entrepreneurial experience 0.068 0.038 0.043 0.034
Number of entrepreneurs they know 4.886 4.668 5.145a 4.069
Number of preferred team members 2.407 2.664 2.543 2.556
Study Major
General Engineering Science 0.102 0.113 0.09 0.086
Constructional and Environmental Engineering 0.148 0.130 0.132 0.116
Bio Process Engineering 0.030 0.042 0.043 0.017
Computer Science 0.119 0.147 0.145 0.147
Electrical Engineering 0.042 0.067b 0.021 0.052
Energy and Environmental Engineering 0.051 0.063 0.056 0.060
Computer Engineering 0.076 0.063 0.094 0.095
Logistics and Mobility 0.131 0.109 0.150 0.142
Mechanical Engineering 0.157 0.147 0.137 0.168
Mechatronics 0.025 0.029 0.013 0.026
Naval Architecture 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.030
Process Engineering 0.051 0.038 0.047 0.034
Note: Every treatment was compared to every other treatment using t-tests. a and b denote
significance at the 5% level for t-tests for the comparison between treatments Choose idea vs.
Choose both and Choose team vs. Choose idea, respectively.
In addition to balance checks regarding individual characteristics, we check the balance for ideas
among those treatments which involve assigning ideas (i.e. Choose team and Choose neither). The
results of a Pearson’s chi-squared test (X2=5.768, p=0.972) show a balanced assignment of ideas,
allaying fears that any difference in treatment effects across these two groups is driven by differences
in the assigned idea per se. Furthermore, Pearson’s chi-squared tests show that both the assignment
of the four treatments to the 40 evaluators (X2=41.749, p=1), and the 15 assigned ideas to evaluators
(X2=141.52, p=1) are random. Our previously described procedure further ensured that no evaluator
assessed the same project or assigned idea multiple times.
4.2. Variables. Dependent Variable. Our dependent variable comes from the evaluation criteria
described earlier, namely novelty, feasibility, market potential, success potential, invitation probabil-
ity, and investment. Apart from information on the founding team (which was redacted on the pitch
decks in order to avert bias) prior work describes these as driving funding decisions made by business
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angels and venture capitalists (e.g. Carpentier Suret, 2015; Maxwell, 2011). The latter three variables
are logged transformed to account for their skewness. All six variables are then standardized using
z-scores to make them comparable. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the baseline Choose
neither group mean and dividing by the Choose neither group standard deviation. Thus, each per-
fermance indicator has mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the baseline Choose neither group (for a
similar approach see Kling et al., 2007).
All evaluators evaluated their assigned entrepreneurship projects in regard to at least three indicators.
In fact, only very few evaluations were missing: one project-evaluator dyad only had three indicators
evaluated, 11 dyads had four observed performance indicators and 43 out of 930 dyads had five out
of six observed indicators, the remaining dyads had all six performance indicators evaluated. These
missing values were imputed at the their respective overall means across all treatment groups (see
Kling et al., 2007). Thus, we end up with 930 dyads, 310 projects evaluted by three evaluators each.
All in all, the six performance indicators have a high internal consistency and reliability in measuring
the project performance in our context (Cronbach’s α = 0.85).
To draw general conclusions about the experiments results, we therefore aggregate information over
the multiple performance indicators. On the one hand, the dependent variable is defined as perfor-
mance index to be the equally weighted average of z-scores of the performance indicators (see Kling
et al., 2007). On the other hand, instead of averaging, we leave the six indicators separate and “stack”
them as our dependent variable in the regressions (see Atkin et al., 2017). This method yields the
same coefficients as an averaged performance index, but produces more conservative estimates (i.e.,
higher standard errors). Furthermore, the “stacked” regression appraoch still allows to detect dif-
ferences in treatment effects for different performance indicators via interaction effects as will be
explained below.
Independent Variables. Our main aim is to uncover how the autonomy to choose team mem-
bers and/or business ideas affects entrepreneurial performance. Our baseline regression specification
therefore includes one dummy variable Team choice that is equal to 1 if teams are allowed to choose
members and 0 otherwise. In terms of our 2X2 design, it is equal to 1 for both the Choose team
and Choose both treatment groups. The other dummy variable Idea choice is equal to 1 if teams are
allowed to choose ideas and 0 otherwise. Hence, it is equal to 1 for both the Choose idea and Choose
both treatment groups. In addition, we include the interaction term as product of both dummies. It
is equal to 1 in the Choose both treatment group, when there is autonomy in choice on both dimen-
sions, and zero otherwise. This model is structurally equivalent to a model with three dummies for
the respective treatment groups Choose team, Choose idea, and Choose both (with Choose neither
excluded as baseline). We prefer this “factorial” specification, however, as it allows us to assess more
directly whether choice along the team and idea dimensions are complements or substitutes in terms
of entrepreneurial performance.
4.3. Estimation. Estimation of treatment effects is straightforward in the context of randomized
experiments. At its most basic, it involves a comparison of means across the different treatments.
The unit of our empirical analysis is the project-evaluator dyad, of which there are 930 (310 projects
× 3 evaluations per project). This permits the inclusion of evaluator fixed effects, which is important
because prior research has found that there is large variation in the assessment of early stage ideas (see
Boudreau et al., 2016, for a similar approach). By the means of fixed effects, we further control for
potential differences in (1) the order in which a specific project was evaluated by a specific evaluator,
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(2) the course cohort in which a specific team participated, and (3) the tutor pair that instructed a
specific team.5
We rely on OLS estimates for our main results due to its ease of interpretation. In order to account for
potential correlation among observations from the same team or evaluator, all standard error estimates
are clustered at the team and evaluator level. The formal specification of our performance regression
model is the following:
(1)
yi j = β0 + β1 ∗ (Team choice)i + β2 ∗ (Idea choice)i+
β3 ∗ (Team choice)i ∗ (Idea choice)i + γi + δi + ζi j + η j + i j
where yi j denotes the performance evaluation of team i as assessed by evaluator j, and Team choice
and Idea choice, as described above, are dummy variables denoting autonomy of choice in team
members or ideas, respectively. The product of both dummies Team choice * Idea choice is supposed
to capture the interaction effect of both treatments. γi is a vector of cohort fixed effects; δi is a vector
of tutor fixed effects; ζi j is a vector of evaluation order fixed effects; η j is a vector of evaluator fixed
effects; and i j is a random error component.
Our parameters of interest are the β′s. In the simultaneous presence of the interaction term, β1
captures the effect of autonomy in Team choice as the difference between the treatment groups Choose
team and Choose neither as baseline. β2 captures the effect of autonomy in Team choice as the
difference between the treatment groups Choose idea and the baseline Choose neither. β3 captures the
effect of autonomy in both Team choice and Idea choice and is effectively a difference-in-differences.
It captures how the just defined performance effects of Team choice and Idea choice change when
teams also have autonomy along the respective other dimension of choice. In other words, it examines
potential complementarities between autonomy in idea and team choice.
Instead of implementing equation 1 separately for each performance indicator, we specify three re-
gression models that aggregate the information of the performave indicators in different ways: Firstly,
with the data gathered in “long” format, we regress the stack of all 6 performance indicators on inter-
actions of the treatment variables with dummies referring to each performance indicator. The coef-
ficients on these interactions provide the treatment effects separately for each performance indicator.
We also include interactions of the performance indicator dummies with the fixed effects of cohorts,
tutors, order and evaluators (see Atkin et al., 2017). The estimated coefficients are identical to those
from separate regressions for each performance indicator, but using this specification the standard
errors clustered account for project- and evaluator-level correlations within and across performance
indicators.
Secondly, in the stacked regression described before, we restrict the coefficients on the treatment
effects to be identical across all six performance indicators. This specification yields the same co-
efficients as an averaged performance index, but produces more conservative estimates (i.e., higher
5 In each cohort, each (pair of) tutors was responsible for two tutorial sesions – meaning they had students from
two different treatments. Tutor pairs were deliberately switched every cohort. Nevertheless, given that 23 tutors were
responsible for tutoring 310 teams, tutors were not perfectly balanced across treatments. We therefore control for tutor
fixed effects in our estimations.
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standard errors) (see Atkin et al., 2017). Thirdly, as a less conservative comparison, we run regres-
sion equation 1 with a performance index as dependent variable that is based on an equally weighted
average of the six performance indicators.
5. RESULTS
5.1. Main Results. Table 4 shows OLS parameter estimation results. Model 2 shows that the Team
choice treatment marginally outperforms the baseline treatment by an increase of 0.206 standard
deviations (p = 0.084 compared to p = 0.015 in Model 3). Model 1 shows that this treatment effect
is significant for the three performance indicators Market Potential, Success Potential and Invitation
Probability. The highest impact refers to Invitation Probability with an increase of 0.274 standard
deviations if teams can be chosen. In terms of unstandardized and unlogged values, this implies an
increase of 5.2 percentage points from 7.4% average invitation probablity in the control group Choose
neither to 12.6% in the Choose team treatment condition – a relative increase of 69.8%.
The Idea choice treatment is highly significant (p < 0.01) across all model specifications and perfor-
mance indicators (except for Feasability). On average the effect implies an increase of 0.411 standard
deviations across all performance indicators. Idea choice has the highest impact on Investment with
an increase of 0.526 standard deviations if ideas can be chosen and are not assigned. In terms of mon-
etary value, this implies an increase of 2,913 (fictional) Dollar from 1,239 Dollar average investment
in the control group Choose neither to 4,152 Dollar average investment in the Choose idea treatment
condition – a relative increase of 235%.
Lastly, the interaction term between the Team choice and the Idea choice treatment is significantly
negative with an average decrease of -0.508 standard deviations across all performance indicators
(p = 0.017 in Model 2 as compared to p = 0.001 in Model 3). Model 1 shows that this interaction
effect is at least marginally significant at p < 0.1 for all performance indicators (except for Newness
with p = 0.174). The largest effect size of this interaction effect is associated to Success Potential
with a decrease of -0.612 standard deviations. The negative interaction effect implies that there is a
performance penalty if teams get to choose both their team member and their ideas. The autonomy
of choosing both teams and ideas do not provide complementary benefits. The benefits of choosing
either do not even add up. Teams that get to choose both teams and ideas actually suffer from a
significant performance penalty compared to the situation of choosing either.
To assess how the Choose both treatment condition compares to the Choose neither condition, we
have to substract the penalty of choosing both from the individual benefits if choosing either teams or
ideas. In the case of Success Potential, the net benefit corresponds to 0.220 + 0.409 − 0.612 = 0.017
standard deviations. Expressed in percentge points for the probability of success, this means an
increase of only 0.29 percentage points from an average success probability of 11.82% in the Choose
neither control group to 12.12% in the Choose both treatment group. Hence, the individual benefits
of choosing either teams or ideas are entirely offset by negative complementarities between both
choices.6
6 The differences between the Choose neither control group and the Choose both treatment group are not significant
on average across all performance inidcators. This becomes evident from regression analyses that instead of the factorial
specification use a specification with three dummy variables each referring to a treatment group. These results are available
upon request.
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Table 4. Regression results for the treatment effects on performance
Stacked Performance
Indicators with
Interactions Stacked Performance
Indicators Performance
Index
(1) (2) (3)
Team choice (β1) 0.206∗ 0.206∗∗
(0.119) (0.085)
Idea choice (β2) 0.411∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.099)
Team choice * Idea choice (β3) −0.508∗∗ −0.508∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.151)
Team choice (β1) * Newness 0.088
(0.143)
Team choice (β1) * Feasibility 0.225
(0.155)
Team choice (β1) * Market Potential 0.222∗∗
(0.112)
Team choice (β1) * Success Potential 0.220∗∗
(0.106)
Team choice (β1) * Invitation Probability 0.274∗∗∗
(0.104)
Team choice (β1) * Investment 0.208
(0.156)
Idea choice (β2) * Newness 0.507∗∗∗
(0.152)
Idea choice (β2) * Feasibility 0.213
(0.159)
Idea choice (β2) * Market Potential 0.417∗∗∗
(0.117)
Idea choice (β2) * Success Potential 0.409∗∗∗
(0.127)
Idea choice (β2) * Invitation Probability 0.394∗∗∗
(0.130)
Idea choice (β2) * Investment 0.526∗∗∗
(0.169)
Team * Idea choice (β3) * Newness −0.325
(0.239)
Team * Idea choice (β3) * Feasibility −0.542∗
(0.279)
Team * Idea choice (β3) * Market Potential −0.525∗∗∗
(0.197)
Team * Idea choice (β3) * Success Potential −0.612∗∗∗
(0.215)
Team * Idea choice (β3) * Invitation Probability −0.556∗∗∗
(0.191)
Team * Idea choice (β3) * Investment −0.491∗
(0.292)
Performance Indicator FE Yes Yes No
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
Mentor FE Yes Yes Yes
Evaluation Order FE Yes Yes Yes
Evaluator FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,580 5,580 930
R2 0.379 0.376 0.408
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the team and evaluator level. β1 is a dummy variable equal
to 1 for treatments with choice in teams; β2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for treatments with choice in ideas; β3 is the interaction term of the two. Model 1 is a
stacked regression showing treatment effects separately for all six performace indicators. Model 2 is a stacked regression restricting treatment effects to be equal
across performance indicators. The interaction effects allowing the treatment effects to vary across performance indicators are jointly significant at a marginal
level (F(5052, 15) = 1.5461; p = 0.08061). Model 3 collapses the performance indicators into a single averaged index in an unstacked regression.
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Figure 1. Conditional treatment group means (predicted from models 2 and 3 with 95% confidence
intervals)
Figure 1 visualizes the predicted treatment effects from the OLS regression models 2 and 3 along
with their 95% confidence intervals. These conditional means mirror those in the raw data, but
conditioning on cohort, tutor, evaluation order, and evaluator fixed effects throughout our analysis
increases precision and further limits potential confoundedness of our treatment effect estimates. It
again becomes evident that Model 3 using the performance index yields less conservative, i.e. larger
confidence intervals.
Both models show that the baseline treatment with no choice of either team members or idea (Choose
neither) results in the lowest performance. Being able to choose the idea but not one’s team (Choose
idea), by contrast, consistently results in the highest performance. The performance of treatment
groups in which teams could choose their members but not the idea (Choose team) is somewhere in
between the Choose neither and Choose idea treatment groups. Teams that could choose along both
dimensions (Choose both) have performance outcomes statistically similar to the baseline (Choose
neither) condition.
5.2. Specification Checks. In this section, we report the results of specification checks, which ad-
dress three main concerns. First, it is reasonable to wonder whether assigned ideas performed worse
than endogenously generated ones simply because assigned ideas were of poor quality. In order to
allay this concern, we conducted an independent quality check of assigned and chosen ideas. In par-
ticular, we randomly selected 15 of the generated ideas and had each written up twice as a paragraph
by four different externals in order to mimick the idea sketches handed out for the 15 assigned ideas.
In a second step, another person combined these paragraphs into one, making sure that none of the
write ups were biased. We then took the 30 idea paragraphs and had them evaluated on Mechanical
Turk along the same performance criteria used in our main analysis (Newness, Market potential and
Success potential; leaving out Investment because judging a possible investment should be done on
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the basis of a pitch deck rather than the simple idea itself). A total of 20 evaluators each evaluated
10 (out of the 30) ideas, leaving us with 200 total evaluations of 15 randomly chosen endogenous
ideas and the 15 exogenous ideas. For our analysis, we include a Choose idea dummy together with
evaluator fixed effects to account for systematic differences between evaluators and we cluster the
standard errors at the evaluator and idea level (idea fixed effects are not possible since our key pre-
dictor, Choose idea, is invariant within ideas). We do not find any statistically significant differences
between ideas that were assigned or chosen for all three criteria (results not shown). This indicates
that our findings are not driven by systematic differences in idea quality across assigned versus chosen
idea treatments, per se.
Second, although we report OLS estimates in our main results for ease of interpretation, the fact that
there are limited dependent variables does technically warrant different estimation methods. We deal
with this by estimating Tobit and ordered Probit models. The results, presented in Appendix ??,
confirm our main results.
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Figure 2. Kernel density estimates of predicted performance per treatment group (based on model 2)
Finally, a common concern in the entrepreneurship and innovation literature is the fact that results
might be driven by the tails of the distribution, meaning that very few highly innovative results skew
the results in one direction (or likewise that few terrible outcomes diminish positive results). In order
to address this concern, we use heteroscedastic regressions to analyze the dispersion. The results
confirm that both the Team choice treatment (p < 0.0448) and the Idea choice treatment (p < 0.0357)
also increase the variance in outcomes next to the means. The interaction effect of choosing both
teams and ideas, however, marginally reduces outcome dispersion (p < 0.0516). We also analyzed
potential outcome dispersion effects visually. We hence estiamtes the kernel density of predicted
performance (measured with the stacked performance indicators) based on regression model 2. Fig-
ure 2 shows kernel densities of predicted performance differentiated according to treatment group.
These results suggest that Choose idea treatment increases the average performance by shifting the
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action to the right-tail of the distribution, while Choose idea and Choose both seem to avoid very bad
performance outcomes.
5.3. Understanding how autonomy in choice matters. Choice is likely to affect outcomes through
four main channels: (i) team composition, (ii) team work, and (iii) satisfaction, and (iv) confidence.
Team composition refers to who is on a team. Team work refers to how work is organized and dis-
tributed in a team. Satisfaction and confidence are subjective assessments. They pertain, respectively,
to whether team members are personally satisfied with their team member and (separately) project
idea, and whether they are confident in their project’s business value. In this section, we explore
whether there is any systematic variation along these four channels across the different choice treat-
ments. We measure these channels in a variety of different ways; variable descriptions and summary
statistics are provided in Table 5. Underlying each of these channels is a recognition that people
make choices for a reason and these choices, in turn, have ramifications for intermediate inputs that
determine a team’s ultimate performance.
Team composition. Homophily is commonly manifested in endogenous team formation. Given the
choice, people tend to work with others who they know, or with whom they share similar character-
istics (McPherson et al., 2001). Table 6 confirms that homophily in terms of observed characteristics
is manifested in our experimental treatments which allowed for Team choice. These teams are sig-
nificantly less diverse with respect to gender (column 2), study majors (column 4) and tenure at the
university (column 5); there is roughly a third less variation in terms of gender and majors and two-
thirds less variation in majors in endogenously formed teams relative to the no choice baseline. The
fact that there are no statistically significant differences between the treatments in terms of age (col-
umn 1) and nationality (column 3) reflects the fact that there is little underlying variation in these
variables from this sample of undergraduate German university students.
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In columns 6 through 9 of Table 6, we continue by examining whether homophily is manifested in
the team choice treatments through assortative matching along potentially unobserved dimensions
including ability, self-confidence, self-reported aspirations to engage in future entrepreneurship, and
self-reported entrepreneurial efficacy. The evidence for homophily along these dimensions in the
team choice treatments is weak. Teams that had autonomy in Team choice, i.e. the treatment groups
Choose team and Choose both, are more homogeneous with regard to entrepreneurial aspiration than
the Choose idea and the baseline Choose neither treatment group (p < 0.01). Teams with autonomy
in Team choice are also more homogenous in terms of self-confidence, but only if they did not also
have autonomy in Idea choice. There is no evidence of assortative matching along the lines of ability
or entrepreneurial efficacy.
Prior network ties amd acquaintance with people often guide and possibly bias a person’s choice of
team members. We capture this through two separate measures. First, in the baseline survey, we
asked people to name up to five people whom they would like have on their entrepreneurial team; this
list represents people with whom they have prior frienship and/ or working ties. Following treatment
assignment, we calculate the number of such preferred ties that was actually realized. Second, in
the endline survey, we asked participants to indicate how many of their team members they knew
beforehand. This allows us to capture whether, given the choice, people are more likely to gravitate
to someone with whom they have a tie than a stranger.
The last two columns of Table 6 show that network ties are significantly more prevalent and stronger
in team choice relative to team assignment treatments. Teams that had autonomy in Team choice,
i.e. the treatment groups Choose team and Choose both, are 80% more likely to be acquainted and
are 94% more likely to belong to a team containing a member from their baseline (5-person) wish
list. The network map in Figure 3 shows this graphically. We find far more realized wishes (ties) for
participants in the two team choice treatments (indicated in red) than for assigned team treatments in
cohort 3. The same pattern holds in the other two cohorts (not shown).
grey - denotes a tie between 2 team members who did not ask to work together during the baseline survey
red - denotes a (realized) tie between 2 team members who asked to work together during the baseline survey 
blue - denotes an (unrealized) tie, where 2 participants asked to work together during the baseline survey but ended up on different teams
Team choice treatments (Cohort 3) Team assigned treatments (Cohort 3) All treatments (Cohort 3)
Figure 3. Network graphs of collaboration ties (wanted / not wanted; realized / unrealized)
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Table 6 underscores three main findings concerning the effect of team choice on team composi-
tion. First, subjects in our experiment tend to exhibit homophily in terms of observed characteristics.
Since others have shown that lack of diversity along these dimensions is associated with worse en-
trepreneurial outcomes, this tendency may well hinder team performance (e.g., Cooper Bruno, 1977;
Horwitz Horwitz, 2007; Steffens et al., 2012). Second, there is little compelling evidence of as-
sortative matching in the team choice treatments along unobserved dimensions – such as ability or
proclivity for entrepreneurship – that would a priori contribute to entrepreneurial performance. On
the one hand, this is not surprising given that these attributes are difficult to observe. On the other
it does suggest that, at least in our setting, that teams may not be formed on the basis of such com-
plementary performance-related attributes. Finally, our results indicate that when given the choice,
people tend to work with friends at the possible expense of choosing the best possible collaborators.
While prior ties can be positive in reducing frictions among people (Reagans, 2011), they can also
lead to complacent teams being formed between people who are friends rather than agents aspiring
to achieve a goal (Ruef et al., 2003).
Teamwork. Table 7 explores how members contribute to teamwork after teams have been assembled.
We measure this in four ways. First, course attendance, which is a proxy for effort. Second, dropout
which measures participation in the team effort. Third, self-reported collaboration within the team.
Fourth, the distribution of the project workload. The results are mixed. Columns 1 to 2 indicate that
there are no significant differences across treatments in terms of commitment to the team, as measured
by class attendance and drop out. At the same time, there is evidence of a more collaborative spirit
among teams with autonomy in Team choice, i.e. the treatment groups Choose team and Choose both
exhibit a higher average collaboration quality than than the Choose idea and the baseline Choose
neither treatment group (p < 0.05). Teams in the Choose team treatment group also overstate the
combined workload to a significantly lower extend, where there is no effect on the workload diversity
among team members. In sum, Table 7 provides some evidence of there being more collaborative
teamwork in treatments which allow for team choice. Unfortunately, this does not seem to readily
translate into improved team performance in these treatments.
Satisfaction. If choice along both the idea and team dimensions is detrimental to performance, then
why is this extent of choice the prevalent model in entrepreneurial teams? One possibility is that
entrepreneurial teams face a trade-off between personal satisfaction and team performance. Table 8
explores this by examining treatment effects with respect to teams’ satisfaction with their members
(Column 1) and the idea (Column 2). It shows that choice lends satisfaction along the dimension
where choice is afforded. Team choice has a significant effect on team satisfaction (p < .01) but
has, as expected, no effect on the satisfaction with the idea. Autonomy in Team choice leads to 13%
higher team satisfaction when comparing the treatment groups Choose team and Choose neither and
a 8% higher team satisfaction when comparing the treatment groups Choose both and Choose neither.
Idea Choice has a significant effect on idea satisfaction (p < .01) but has, as expected, no effect on
the satisfaction with the team. Autonomy in Idea choice leads to 18% higher idea satisfaction when
comparing the treatment groups Choose idea and Choose neither and a 22% higher idea satisfaction
when comparing the treatment groups Choose both and Choose neither. If the penalty for greater
choice is entrepreneurial performance, these results suggest that the reward is personal satisfaction.
This points to a potential rationale for why so many entrepreneurial projects develop organically in
terms of both team composition and idea generation, even if the odds of them failing are higher as a
result.
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Table 8. Satisfaction and confidence
Dependent variable:
Team Satisfaction Idea Satisfaction Perceived Potential Commitment
(Mean) (Mean) (Mean) (Mean)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Team choice (β1) 0.769∗∗∗ 0.110 −6.518 −0.201
(0.220) (0.178) (4.720) (1.877)
Idea choice (β2) 0.079 0.859∗∗∗ −0.087 −0.925
(0.236) (0.183) (4.397) (2.401)
Team choice * Idea choice (β3) −0.403 0.226 20.242∗∗ 9.047∗∗∗
(0.402) (0.284) (7.908) (2.553)
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mentor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 309 309 309 309
R2 0.101 0.320 0.210 0.175
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the tutor level.
Confidence. The last two columns of Table 8 gauge the effect of choice on the subjective assessment
of a project’s potential to succeed (Column 3) and team members’ stated intent to pursue the project in
the future. These two measures capture team member’s confidence in their project quality. The results
indicate that only the interaction term between Team choice and Idea Choice is significant (p < 0.05
and p < 0.01, respectively). This means that only teams in the the Choose both treatment group
are significantly more confident in the project compared to the baseline Choose neither treatment
group. Subjective assessment of project potential is 23% higher, and stated intent to pursue the
project in the future is 39% higher than in the baseline no choice treatment. This juxtaposition
between greater satisfaction and higher confidence on the one hand and poorer performance on the
other hand is striking. It suggests that a key ingredient in the paradox of choice may be that it
generates overconfidence.
In sum, we find that allowing for team choice results in more homogeneity in team composition along
observable dimensions, without the benefits of assortative matching along unobserved dimensions
which are likely to foster team performance. At the same time, given the option, individuals are more
likely to choose team members who belong to their network. In other words, homophily in team
composition generates teams whose members resemble one another and probably like one another,
without the benefits of complementary skills or traits. This is manifested in the fact that endogenously
selected teams do not seem to display markedly more efficient team work. This raises the question
of why endogenously formed teams and organically developed ideas are the rule rather than the
exception. A simple, but plausible, rationale suggested by our data is that giving people choice
makes them happier in the dimension along which choice is afforded. At the same time, choice on
both dimensions generates confidence, or perhaps even overconfidence given the negative effects on
performance relative to other choice treatments.
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6. DISCUSSION
Autonomy in choosing tasks and collaborators has been at the heart for organizational theorists for
decades (Puranam et al., 2014). Inside traditional organizations, there is usually little room for em-
ployees to choose their collaborators and tasks they want to work on. Entrepreneurship, in contrast,
often provide more room for founders to self-assemble teams and the ideas they want to execute. Be-
tween the two polar extremes, there are also different hybrids allowing some choice (Baumann et al.,
2018). This paper sought to address this question through a field experiment, whose major appeal
is that it allows for causal inference while having sufficiently large sample sizes to allow for mean-
ingful statistical inference: our experiment involved 900+ participants and over 300 teams. In order
to address our main research question, subjects in a two-by-two experimental design were randomly
assigned to one of four treatments in which they (i) chose both their team and the idea to pursue; (ii)
chose their own team members but not the idea; (iii) chose their own idea but not their team; or (iv)
chose neither their team nor the idea.
We find that freedom of choice on either or both of these dimensions at least weakly dominates having
no choice on either of these dimensions. In other words, autonomy in choice matters and generally
increase pitch-deck performance. At the same time, how much choice and what kind of choice one
has also matters. We find that allowing for choice on the idea dimension and disallowing it on the
team dimension results in the best performance outcomes. This result is striking because it indicates
that, once you allow teams the freedom to choose their own idea, a randomly assigned team would
perform better than one where people choose their collaborators.
Our results show that high autonomy in choosing implies a trade-off between personal satisfaction
and objective performance. Self-determined choices along both dimensions promote subjective well-
being in a complementary way, but their joint performance impact is diminishing. After ruling out
alternative explanations related to differing project qualities and homophilic team choices, the detri-
mental performance impact of too much choice seems to be related to the implied cognitive burden
and overconfidence. Our results yield implications for the literature on organizational design of en-
trepreneurial orientation in firms (Foss et al., 2015) as we highlight the importance and limits of two
organizational design levers that can help to promote entrepreneurial culture in firms. On the other
hand, we speak to the behavioral economics literature on entrepreneurship (Benz Frey, 2008) as we
experimentally validate procedural utility to arise from the freedom of choice in entrepreneurship,
but also to potentially limit entrepreneurial performance.
We argue that choice is likely to affect outcomes through four main channels: (i) team composition,
(ii) team work, (iii) team satisfaction, and (iv) confidence. With respect to team composition, we find
that endogenously formed teams more homophilous on many observable dimensions and tend to rely
on pre-existing networks. However, homophily is not exhibited in terms of unobserved characteristics
that would seem conducive to entrepreneurial success. This, in turn, is borne out in our finding that
subjects in the team choice treatments do not seem to be working more effectively as a team.
If endogenously formed teams perform worse than assigned teams, why is the former so frequently
observed in practice? Our results point to two answers. The first is that, conditional on being assigned
to an idea, self-selected teams perform at least weakly better than assigned teams: some choice is
better than none. The second is that choice increases satisfaction. People are more satisfied with their
idea, when they came up with it, and they are more satisfied with their team when they get to decide
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who is in it. Unfortunately, conditional on being able to choose ones idea, the latter does not translate
into higher performance. People may be happier when they choose their team members, but when
they also get to choose their ideas, their confidence in the merits of their project is not commensurate
to its actual performance. A stylized fact in entrepreneurship research is that entrepreneurs often
persist in their endeavors despite having low average returns (albeit being over-represented in the
tails of the distribution) (Hamilton, 2000). One explanation is that entrepreneurs prefer autonomy
and are thus willing to forsake part of their income (Moskowitz Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). Our result
support this conjecture by showing that autonomy in the choice of both teams and ideas makes people
in this treatment happier; convinces them that their idea has potential; and makes them more likely to
pursue it in the future.
Choosing ideas matters for performance: teams that endogenously choose the idea they wanted to
work on consistently showed higher performance. (We show in robustness checks that this is not
driven by the possibility that assigned ideas per se were of low quality.) In some sense this echoes
conventional wisdom: the thought bubble over peoples heads in comic strips typically contains a light
bulb, and not a bunch of team members. Nevertheless, this is a noteworthy finding in light of recent
discussions from practitioners who hail the team as the most important ingredient of entrepreneurial
success (see e.g., Blank, 2007). It also substantiates the work of Kornish Ulrich (2014), who empha-
size the relative importance of ideas generated by teams in very early stages of entrepreneurship.
Our findings indicate that some choice is better than no choice, but there is such a thing as having
“too much choice”. There are two main reasons for why choice along both the idea and team di-
mension may be detrimental to team performance. First, giving participants the freedom to choose
along multiple dimensions might make the task of developing a business plan – a task that is highly
complex to begin with – even too complex. Overwhelmed participants might not have been able to
efficiently allocate their resources, thus slacking in overall performance. Second, there is likely to be
a tradeoff between personal benefits and business performance. We find that self-selected teams are
more cohesive, homogeneous, and happier. Yet, it stands to reason that the focus of a high perform-
ing team should not be on satisfaction, but rather on efficiency, characterized by effective working
relationships with a clear division of labor (Hoogendoorn et al., 2017). Developing a business idea
with people you do not go for after-work drinks with likely shifts the focus on getting the job done,
leading to a higher performance.
The findings in this paper are pertinent to the “professionalization of entrepreneurship”, particu-
larly through incubator and accelerator programs. Most accelerators and incubators give aspiring
entrepreneurs choice on both the idea and team dimensions. Occasionally – for example, in Berlins
Rocket Internet – they are afforded choice in neither dimension. Our results indicate that there may
be a more effective third way, namely, assigning teams but letting them freely choose their idea. This
precludes assortative matching and may detract from personal happiness generated from social inter-
actions. But it is likely to generate the kind of environment in which better ideas can flourish and be
translated into more successful entrepreneurial team performance.
6.1. Limitations and future research. The experimental design and main results presented in the
paper followed a pre-analysis plan, which was pre-registered at the Social Science Registry of the
American Economic Association. This set up enables to draw causal inference without being suscep-
tible to p-hacking. In addition, conducting our field experiment among this group of business students
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permitted a large enough sample size to allow for statistically meaningful inference. Still, this paper
has several limitations.
Our experimental subjects comprised students in an entrepreneurship class who were tasked with pro-
ducing an entrepreneurial pitch deck. This context mirrored that used by Hoogendoorn et al. (2013,
2017), who conduct field experiments with roughly 50 teams of business students. The rationale for
this field setting was to have over 300 teams a sample size large enough to permit meaningful statis-
tical inference. While our experimental design mimicked a real entrepreneurial setting by using real
investors and entrepreneurs in the evaluation of these pitch decks, a drawback of this setting is that the
subjects themselves were students, and not real-world entrepreneurs. This places natural limitations
on the potential generalizability of our findings.
Another challenge is the potential for contamination across treatment groups. We sought to minimize
this by carefully separating experimental conditions across time and space. In addition, neither tutors
nor students were aware that they were participating in an experiment. Nevertheless, we cannot rule
out the possibility that there was some communication across teams in different treatment groups.
Our approach compares teams who are permitted choice in choosing team members and ideas with
those who do not have that choice. The control group in this context consists of randomly formed
teams and randomly allocated ideas. In real life, organizations do not form teams at random – they
form teams in the hope of achieving superior performance. There are several ways in which such
teams could form, such as through maximizing functional and social diversity (Lamaze Van Knip-
penberg, 2014) or allowing team members to have some prior connections (Reagans et al., 2004). An
interesting future line of research would be compare different such baselines rather than randomly
assigned teams.
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APPENDIX B. PICTURES OF TEAM AND IDEA SESSIONS
A2
APPENDIX C. SESSION OVERVIEW
Session Title Event
1 Team building Intervention for endogenous or exogenous team composition
2 Idea specification Intervention for endogenous or exogenous topic
3 Customer Regular class
4 Vision Regular class
5 Prototyping Regular class
6 Market analysis Regular class
7 Marketing Regular class
8 Pricing Regular class
9 Finances Regular class
10 Feedback Peer and teacher feedback on pitch deck draft
11 Final presentation 10min final pitch from each team; exit survey afterwards
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APPENDIX D. PRE-DETERMINED IDEAS
01) Veganism is the (mostly ethically motivated) complete renunciation of animal products, particu-
larly when it comes to food. Vegan food and a sustainable, healthy and possibly regional diet have
gained considerable attention in recent years. A growing interest in veganism is reflected in the in-
creasing demand for meat substitute products and plant-based alternatives. The number of vegan
restaurants has increased considerably in recent years and there is a growing demand. Those who
choose a life style free of animal-based products, and who like to cook for themselves but have little
time or not enough experience often miss suitable opportunities and offers.
02) Spontaneous visits to pubs, restaurants, and bars can get tricky due to lack of space. This is
especially the case when a larger group is looking to sit together. One way to deal with this problem
would be a group reservation, but this requires a certain degree of planning and spontaneous visits to
a restaurant are impossible. Another interesting point in this context is the fact that larger tables are
”under-occupied”. This means that, for example, a table for four persons is only used by two.
03) During sightseeing or a city outing, you would usually learn about cultural and historical aspects
of your destination. Unfortunately, you do not know the place and guided tours can take too long. In
addition, guides tours typically concentrate on one part of the city/sights and you may find yourself
in a throng of other tourists, wedged into a historical building or a monument. Therefore, people may
prefer to discover sights or a city independently, but lack the historical/cultural knowledge about the
place.
04) This may sound familiar: It is the end of the month, and the data plan on your smartphone
is exhausted. It takes ages for a website to load. Mobile service providers advertise increasingly
favorable tariffs, which at the same time offer more and more data volumes. But why not use free
hotspots, which are now available in every city? The downside is that to log in and to enter the
required data repeatedly is often time- consuming.
05) In modern society, health in general and a healthy diet in particular are becoming more and
more important. For many, a healthy juice is part of every breakfast. However, sugar and industrial
additives are often added to such juices. In addition to physical needs for allergy sufferers, there
is also great potential through fun during customizing your own product. There is a limited range
of juice varieties, which can impose unnecessary restrictions on allergy sufferers or consumers who
prefer more choice.
06) Job interviews usually have several stages. The entire application process is very complex and
costs time and money. One way of avoiding these costs could be to shorten application periods and,
for example, retrieve important information from cover letters and CVs. However, this way, employ-
ers often miss out on a comprehensive impression of an applicant. Video interview are becoming
increasingly popular in application processes, as they reduce travel time. Still, it is necessary to
agree on a specific date, which can also be cost-relevant and time-intensive in the first stages of an
application.
07) Individual design is becoming more and more popular, be it in fashion, interior design, etc.. Com-
missioning a professional designer is very costly, so unique, customized designs are only available to
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those on a high income. Apart from exclusively designed products, there is a great potential of tal-
ented and capable young designers, who can support a large variety of favorable, aesthetic life styles
with their flair and individuality, while building their own portfolio.
08) It is a common saying that a dog is a man’s best friend. Nevertheless, keeping a dog means taking
responsibility and many dogs end up in the animal shelter. Their owners realize that they simply do
not have the time or capacity to take care of them, particularly during holidays, as often pets cannot
be taken along.
09) Geocaching is a modern form of treasure hunting. Equipped with a Global Positioning System
(GPS) receiver and the coordinates of a ”treasure” (for example from online forums), the treasure
hunter can locate what others have hidden in unusual places. Another example are Live Escape
Games, where small groups of people are (virtually) locked in a room or several rooms and have to
escape their jail again within a given time (usually 60 minutes) with the help of hidden notes and
objects. Both activities are becoming increasingly popular, for people of all ages. Still, there is no
combination of the two.
10) Moving something from A to B proves often more difficult than transporting people. Small items
can be conveniently sent by mail and other service providers, bulkier objects are more difficult to dis-
patch. At the same time, there is much, albeit underused, capacity when it comes to privately owned
cars. Here, it is quite usual to offer someone a lift, but not so much when it comes to transporting
items.
11) In the past fifteen year, the amount of plastic waste in Germany has more than doubled. Most of
the plastic waste ends up in the ocean posing a serious threat to sea life. Inevitably, plastic then ends
up on our plates when we eat seafood. Advertising material, such as posters and flyers, which are
only short-lived, are good examples of such plastic waste. Using degradable materials would help to
counteract this problem.
12) Many public places lack opportunities to buy fresh, healthy snacks, although there is definitely
a demand. But what people get is unhealthy snacks, such as crisps, sweets, and sugary drinks from
vending machines. Healthy alternatives to conventional vending-machine snacks is what is needed.
A balanced offer of in-between meals in the fast way is still missing. Instead of fatty and sugary
snacks, appropriate alternatives are required.
13) Shipping boxes in all shapes and sizes have become very popular in recent years. You can have
anything delivered at home in the appropriate box: books, cosmetics, food. But what is missing here
is interaction between people. Customers do not only want the purchased article as such, they also
want communicate about it, try out something new, share it with friends.
14) For more and more people, the work- life balance is very important. But with the immense variety
and different possibilities out there, it gets increasingly difficult to find the right balance between life
and work. Annoying and unpopular activities such as food shopping, restaurant booking, but also the
birthday present for the aunt etc. could happily be given to somebody else.
15) Becoming a university or college student mostly entails moving to another city or country even.
Everything is new, exciting, and strange. What students often miss is a contact center, where they can
get information about living, working, studying, events, travelling, and get advice on how to live on
a low budget.
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APPENDIX E. EVALUATION PROCEDURE
This evaluation was presented to the evaluators during their evaluation. They were given each section
in numerical order.
1) Introduction
Dear evaluator,
we have 23-24 pitch decks for your review. These were created by students as part of a university
competition. The aim of this review is to reward the best pitch decks. First of all, we would like to
ask you to provide some information about yourself and your experience in the field of start ups.
Afterwards, please rate each pitch deck in the order of the stack. All decks are enclosed with an
evaluation form stapled to the front. Each pitch deck should be rated in the categories ”novelty of the
idea”, ”feasibility of the idea”, ”market potential of the idea” and ”implementation as a pitch deck”.
The assessment is on a scale of 1 (really bad) to 7 (really good). In addition, you should estimate the
probabilities for inviting the team and the success of a company founded on the basis of the respective
pitch deck as a percentage.
After completing the individual evaluations of each pitch deck, please decide on possible investments
in the respective start ups in a second step. For this, we provide you with an investment budget of 1
Mio. Startup-$. You should distribute this money on the pitch decks according to your preferences.
Please stick the appropriate investment amount to the evaluation form of the respective pitch deck. If
you do not want to use part of your budget, leave the stickers aside. You will then receive another
short final questionnaire. We ask that you do not talk to the other evaluators during the evaluation. If
you have questions, you can always contact us directly.
We sincerely thank you for your participation and wish you a lot of fun!
2) Evaluator information
Please provide the following information:
Name
Gender
Year of birth
Highest academic degree (and field)
Current job (and field)
I have founded startups.
I have worked in startups.
I have coached startups.
I have participated in courses and training in the field of startups.
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I have co-funded startups with my personal capital.
I was involved in deciding on the financing of investor-initiated startups.
I have already rated startups.
3) Evaluation of each individual pitch deck
Please rate this pitch deck along the following criteria using a 7-point scale (1 = really bad, 7 =
really good):
Novelty
Feasibility
Market Potential
Implementation as a pitch deck
Personal interest in the idea
What is the likelihood that you will invite the start-up team for a personal interview? (0-100%)
What is the probability of success of a start-up based on this pitch deck? (1-100%)
Please allocate your budget of 1 Mio. Startup-$ on sticky paper between your bunch of pitch decks.
4) Exit questions
Did you understand the task? (y/n)
Did you feel qualified to evaluate these pitch decks? (1) not at all — (7) absolutely
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APPENDIX F. BASELINE SURVEY
The following survey was given to the participants before the experiment. It was mandatory for
participation in the class and had no impact on the random assignment of participants to treatment -
despite the survey being masked as a team assignment exercise. This course of action, as well as the
experiment in its entirety, was approved by the responsible ethics committee of the university. This
is a translation of the original survey from German:
1) Introduction
Dear student,
The goal of this class (”Project Entrepreneurship”) is to show you how to successfully build a startup
by working on a practical project in a team. To ensure your succes, we try to assign suitable project
teams and tasks to you. We would like to ask you for some information in this 10-minute survey.
Before starting with the first exercise, you will be informed about your allocation to a team.
ATTENTION: We would like to point out that completing this survey is mandatory for project par-
ticipant. Leaving the class during the semester is not possible. If you complete the project, but do not
participate directly in the exam, we will gladly include your project grade in the future.
Thank you for your support.
2) Personal Details
Please state your full name.
Please state your e-mail address.
Please state your gender.
Please state your year of birth.
Please state your educational background.
Please state your current semester.
Which performance range do you see yourself in at the end of the project compared to your fellow
students? (Top 5% Top 10%, Top 25%, Top 50%, Bottom 50%)
How do your rate your own risk behavior? (0) extremely risk averse — (100) extremely risk seeking
How much would you spend on a lottery ticket with a 10% chance to win 1000e? (integer values)
Have you ever become self-employed or founded your own company? (y/n)
Have you ever participated in entrepreneurship focused courses, trainings or competitions? (y/n)
How many of your relatives are or have been self-employed or have established a company? (integer
values)
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How many of your friends are or have been self-employed or have founded a company? (integer
values)
How many newly founded companies have your worked in or managed? (integer values)
Please answer the following questions on a scale from 1 (not true at all) to 7 (completely true).
I feel capable of: starting and running a successful company; defining realistic objectives for a
company; designing products and services that solve current problems; doing a market research;
setting a profitable price for a product or a service; making decisions under uncertainty and risk;
creating products and services that meet the needs of current customers; identifying potential sources
of funding for investments; keeping an overview of the business costs.
3) Your motivation
What kind of work will you most likely pursue after graduation? (large company, medium/small
company, consultancy, academia, entrepreneur)
How likely will you start a business or become self-employed after graduation? ((0) completely
unlikely — (100) completely sure)
4) Team composition
Please name up to 5 preferred team members.
Please state how you know each of your preferred team members. (We know each other from univer-
sity. We know each other from outside university.)
Please state how close you are with each of your preferred team members. (We are loose acquain-
tances. We are acquaintances. We are friends. We are good friends.)
Please rank the following entrepreneurial tasks from highest to lowest according to your preference.
(Strategic planning and vision; Product design; Technical development; Marketing and sales; Fi-
nance)
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APPENDIX G. ENDLINE SURVEY
This survey was presented to the participants in paper form after the final presentation. Each par-
ticipant was uniquely identified by the tutors and given their corresponding survey. This survey was
masked as the teaching evaluation. Some of the questions are repeated from the entry survey to
monitor students’ progress. This is a translation of the original survey from German:
1) Introduction
Dear student,
in order to improve this class (”Project Entrepreneurship”), we ask you to participate in this 10-min
survey. The goal of this survey is to identify possible areas for future improvements for following
semesters. Your answers have no impact on your grade and are treated anonymously.
Thank you for your support.
2) Teaching goals
Please answer the following questions on a scale from 1 (not true at all) to 7 (completely true).
I feel capable of: starting and running a successful company; defining realistic objectives for a
company; designing products and services that solve current problems; doing a market research;
setting a profitable price for a product or a service; making decisions under uncertainty and risk;
creating products and services that meet the needs of current customers; identifying potential sources
of funding for investments; keeping an overview of the business costs.
What kind of work will you most likely pursue after graduation? (large company, medium/small
company, consultancy, academia, entrepreneur)
Which performance range do you see yourself in at the end of the project compared with your fellow
students? (Top 5% Top 10%, Top 25%, Top 50%, Bottom 50%)
How likely will you start a business or become self-employed after graduation? ((0) completely
unlikely — (100) completely sure)
3) Team work
Please answer the following questions on a scale from 1 (not true at all) to 7 (completely true). The
members of my team: (had good work relationships; had good friendship relationships; enjoyed
spending work time together; enjoyed spending free time together; were good colleagues; were good
friends)
How much of the workload did you contribute to the team workload? (percentage value)
With how many of your team members would you work again? (all/some/none)
How many of your team members did you know before this class? (all/some/none)
How did you distribute tasks within your team? ((1) we worked completely individually – (7) we
worked completely collaboratively)
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4) Idea
Please answer the following questions on a scale from 1 (not true at all) to 7 (completely true). Our
project idea: (had me excited.; had me motivated; made it possible for me to identify myself with the
idea; was suited for this class; matched my previous expertise; matched with my team)
How do you rate the success potential of a company based on your idea? (percentage)
How likely would you found a company based on your idea? (percentage)
5) Satisfaction How happy were you with your team? (1) extremely dissatisfied — (7) extremely
satisfied
How happy were you with your project idea? (1) extremely dissatisfied — (7) extremely satisfied
There were a number of additional questions similar to those typically asked in a teaching evaluation,
but these were not used for this experiment, because they pertained to topics such as rooms, times,
and lectures.
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